Not surprisingly, Temple professor John Goldkamp, an architect of the city's failed system, opposes commercial bail. His view is endorsed by a phalanx of bureaucrats whose only proposed solution is to tune up a system with a proven genius for failure and prop it up with an expanded, expensive, and publicly funded cohort of public servants - in other words, not only more of the same, but more and more of the same.
Commercial bail cannot fix Philadelphia's broken criminal-justice system. But it can help.
Commercial bail is an insurance policy for the city. If the defendant does not appear and a forfeiture judgment is executed, a commercial bail agency must pay the amount of the bond or lose its license. (Licensing fees are another source of revenue for the city.) So there is a powerful financial incentive to recover the absconder, and, if that fails, to pay the forfeiture and stay in business.
Under Philadelphia's system, by contrast, bail bonds are junk bonds; there is nothing backing them up. If a defendant absconds, the city is out 90 percent of the bond in cases where defendants were required to post 10 percent, or 100 percent in other cases.
But can Philadelphia tolerate commercial bail's success rate? If it's so efficient at recovering fugitives, won't it further clog the city's already crowded jails?
Not necessarily. The number of bail-jumpers returned to custody would likely be offset by a higher number of defendants who are not confined while awaiting trial.
Furthermore, the cost of recovering fugitives would be borne solely by bonding agents, saving the city money on law enforcement and extradition.
A few other myths standing in the way of commercial bail can be easily dispelled, including:
