Worldview: Egypt's adept Islamists outsmart military

November 23, 2011|By Trudy Rubin, Inquirer Columnist
  • Egyptians crowd around to learn locations of their polling stations, a service provided on the street by Muslim Brotherhood, "the Freedom and Justice Party" in Cairo, Egypt late Thursday, Nov.17, 2011. On Nov. 28, millions of Egyptians will gather at the polls to vote in the first phase of parliamentary elections following the ousting of the Mubarak regime. (AP Photo/Amr Nabil)

As young revolutionaries once again battle Egyptian security forces in Tahrir Square, only one group stands to emerge victorious from the melee: the Islamist cadres of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Although the current violence has pitted revolutionary youth against the army, the real tussle is between the Brotherhood and the council of generals that is now ruling the country. Unable to think strategically, and (mercifully) unwilling to murder thousands, the generals have been outfoxed by the Islamists.

While the youth rage, and the military dithers, the Brothers advance step by step toward victory in elections that start Monday. The Islamists know that, irrespective of how this week's violence ends, the legitimacy bestowed by an election is the ticket to power in Egypt in the near term. And they believe that this legitimacy will enable them to curb the power of the army in the longer run.

Story continues below.

The current round of violence was triggered by a massive Islamist demonstration Friday in Tahrir Square (which deteriorated after the army clashed with revolutionary youth who subsequently poured into the square).

The Muslim Brotherhood had called for the demonstration weeks earlier as a warning to the generals not to interfere with the elections. The generals - known as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, or SCAF - were not always at loggerheads with the Brotherhood. Shortly after the Tahrir Square revolution, the Brotherhood made a quiet deal with the SCAF to leave each other alone.

The SCAF expected that the Islamists wouldn't object if the generals retained their perks and powers after the voting. The Brotherhood had pledged to contest only 30 percent of the seats, and didn't seem like a daunting threat. Instead, the SCAF turned against secular opposition groups - including revolutionary youth. It distrusted the seculars because it feared it couldn't control them. Many of the youth were beaten up or hauled before military tribunals, and human-rights groups were threatened with lawsuits. The warmth that the revolutionary youth had felt for the army rapidly vanished.

Meantime, the political situation on the ground developed differently than what the army had foreseen. As expected, liberal and social democratic parties proved unable to organize. But far more problematic from the military's point of view, the Muslim Brotherhood, with its long-honed network of followers and a reputation for providing social services, proved stronger than expected.

1 | 2 | Next »
|
|
|
|
|