So why did the Muslim Brotherhood, via its Freedom and Justice Party, do so well at the polls?
In part, because the Facebook rebels proved unable to translate their skills into campaign operations. They continued to rally in Tahrir Square, but failed to organize effectively for elections, rather than creating a broad political coalition. They had no charismatic leaders with name recognition, and no clear platforms. Also, the large numbers of parties and the complicated voting system confused first-time voters.
The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand offered a recognizable brand name. And for many traditional Muslims, the idea of a "good Muslim" getting elected to office was comforting; the concept of civil (secular) parties was misunderstood, with the term secular misinterpreted as hostile to religion.
When I visited Cairo's working-class Imbaba neighborhood in November, many locals told me they would vote for the Brotherhood party's candidates because they were "good people who did good things for the poor." Similarly, the more fundamentalist Nour Party of Salafi Islamists, which finished second in many districts, also garnered popularity by its charitable work.
Long banned from politics, the Brotherhood gave up violence and focused on social work. It developed a tight organizational structure all around the country and gathered thousands of loyal followers. It provided a steady stream of funds to the religious organization (as did Arab gulf countries). This gave it a great monetary advantage over nonreligious parties.
Once its party was legalized, the Brotherhood's cadres of veiled women and youths got out to vote. Its computerized operations weren't unlike those of machine pols in the wards of Chicago or New York.
