Worldview: Taliban talks not likely to effect an honorable U.S. exit from Afghanistan

Now that U.S. troops have left Iraq, the administration is seeking to negotiate an end to the Afghan war.

So there was some excitement last week when an Afghan Taliban spokesman announced that the group would open a political office in the Arab Gulf state of Qatar, dropping its long-held objections to peace talks. This move comes after months of secret efforts by the Obama administration.

Yet, anyone who believes that talks with the Taliban will lead to an honorable exit is deluding himself.

I sympathize with President Obama's desire to end the second messed-up conflict he inherited from the Bush team. President George W. Bush snatched defeat from the jaws of victory when he dropped the focus on fixing postwar Afghanistan in favor of invading Iraq. This enabled a Taliban comeback.

Ten years after the overthrow of the Taliban, the United States still has 100,000 troops fighting it in Afghanistan; the bulk of those troops are supposed to be withdrawn by 2014. Despite some U.S. military gains, however, there's broad agreement on three harsh facts: First, the Taliban can't be militarily defeated so long as the fighters have safe havens across the border in Pakistan; second, the Pakistanis won't close down those havens; and third, the weak Afghan government and army will probably lose control of much of the country once U.S. troops leave.

Given these facts, some will say we should just walk away. In that case, Afghanistan would likely collapse into civil war, and serve again as a haven for terrorist groups that want to strike at the West. Even worse (and contrary to the delusions of Pakistan's military), Afghanistan may become a base from which radical Islamists can seek control of the nuclear-armed Pakistani state.

So, the administration has little choice but to explore a peace deal.

The issue is not whether to talk, but how these talks are to be conducted, and what their real goals are. Will they serve the interests of Afghans and Afghan peace? Or will they merely provide cover for an American exit, irrespective of what follows - like the 1973 Paris Peace Accords that allowed U.S. troops to quit South Vietnam but led to a North Vietnamese takeover by 1975?

It's not clear yet what the Qatar office will lead to, but let me suggest five criteria by which these proceedings can be judged: